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Operationalizing Norms, Material Incentives and Climate Action
1. Background Paper – “The Reinforcement Effect: How Climate Concerns 
Foster Competitiveness in the Global Economy”
o Interaction effects between norms and incentives
o U-shaped relationship between CFP and CEP
2. Operationalization: How to measure/observe norms, material incentives 
and climate action
3.   Roundtable Methodology (Sarah Van Eynde)
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Background Paper – “The Reinforcement Effect: How Climate 
Concerns Foster Competitiveness in the Global Economy”
o What is a norm?
• “Standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998: 891)
• Logic of appropriateness: where actors follow 
a rule or shared idea that is perceived as the “right thing to do”
• Examples:
• Smoking in public places
• Child labour
• Drug abuse
o At this Roundtable: “genuine” climate
concerns present within an organisation
as a whole (e.g. company, government
agency)
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Background Paper – “The Reinforcement Effect: How Climate 
Concerns Foster Competitiveness in the Global Economy”
o What are material incentives?
• Tangible, material rewards for certain types of behaviour
• Often associated with a logic of (expected) consequences (rational choice), where 
actors aim to maximize utility.
o At this Roundtable: companies are often perceived as purely 
“rational” actors. But observations show a puzzling variation
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Background Paper – “The Reinforcement Effect: How Climate 
Concerns Foster Competitiveness in the Global Economy”
o Beyond the dichotomy: interaction effects of norms and incentives
1. Blinding effect
2. Cognitive dissonance
3. Reinforcement effect
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Background Paper – “The Reinforcement Effect: How Climate 
Concerns Foster Competitiveness in the Global Economy”
o Blinding effect: Norms trump material incentives
o When a company (or other organisation) is “blinded” by an 
overemphasis on the logic of appropriateness, creating negative 
impacts in terms of profitability
o Examples: 
• too optimistic expectations vis-à-vis customer uptake of green products
• too costly or “wrong” investments in green equipment
• Over-subsidization of solar panels
o Often create backlash in both economic and environmental ways 
(e.g. solar panel subsidies in Flanders)
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Background Paper – “The Reinforcement Effect: How Climate 
Concerns Foster Competitiveness in the Global Economy”
o Cognitive dissonance effect: material incentives trump norms
o When a company (or other organisation) is deliberately chooses a 
GHG-intensive investment with high short-term return on investment 
even when a viable climate-friendly alternative with a longer term 
IRR (internal rate of return) is available. 
o Over time, the company may be forced (e.g. by its shareholders or 
because of reputational concerns) to reconsider this investment. 
o Examples: 
• Extensive coal power development plans in several Asian countries (notably India)
• Investments in oil exploration in the Arctic
o These investments are often turned back, leading to suboptimal 
economic and environmental outcomes (similar to the blinding effect)
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Background Paper – “The Reinforcement Effect: How Climate 
Concerns Foster Competitiveness in the Global Economy”
o Reinforcement effect: material incentives and norms are balanced
o Takes place when both logics are implemented coherently and 
reinforce each other.
o A logic of appropriateness could provide an extra “push” to invest 
time and resources in a company’s search for long-term solutions 
that improve both its business performance and its climate impacts. 
o Iterative, mutually reinforcing process that could also involve the 
following elements:
• Longer term cost savings (energy, waste reductions)
• Attraction of a loyal segment of (new) customers
• Stable and collaborative partnerships with other companies and 
organisations (e.g. joint transport solutions)
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Background Paper – “The Reinforcement Effect: How Climate 
Concerns Foster Competitiveness in the Global Economy”
o Reinforcement effect: material incentives and norms are balanced
o A logic of appropriateness could provide an extra “push” to invest 
time and resources in a company’s search for long-term solutions 
that improve both its business performance and its climate impacts. 
o At the level of the employees / board of directors of the firm:
• “Extra” motivation to find optimal solutions, both in terms of profitability and 
environmental performance, for example most efficient lighting, or most 
cutting-edge production equipment.
• Collaboration between financial, technical and sustainability departments
• Expected to thrive best in innovative, creative enterprises (e.g. Apple, 
Tesla,…)
• IMPORTANT LINK WITH INNOVATION
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Background Paper – “The Reinforcement Effect: How Climate 
Concerns Foster Competitiveness in the Global Economy”
o Reinforcement effect: material incentives and norms are balanced
o Example of Unilever:
o about 50 percent of its growth in 2014 came from sustainable living brands, 
which also grew at twice the rate of the rest of the business
o “This sense of purpose and our USLP attracts and retains talent”
o But CEO Paul Polman, architect of Unilever’s SD 
strategy also warns against a “blinding effect”:
o “imperative that the relationship between the ethical 
and the financial be understood as one of reciprocity 
and balance: just as the pursuit of financial capital 
should not be at the expense of the environment, 
businesses should not resort to excessive philanthropy” 
(Bell 2013: 39).
Paul Polman, CEO of Unilever
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Background Paper – “The Reinforcement Effect: How Climate 
Concerns Foster Competitiveness in the Global Economy”
o Reinforcement effect: material incentives and norms are balanced
o Example of Triodos Bank:
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Background Paper – “The Reinforcement Effect: How Climate 
Concerns Foster Competitiveness in the Global Economy”
o U-shaped relationship between CFP and CEP (TLGT)
o Too-little-of-a-good-thing effect
o First proposed by Trumpp and Guenther (2015)
o Background:
• Conflicting hypotheses since 1970s: In 1970, Milton Friedman kicked off the debate 
by stating that the “social responsibility of business is to increase its profits” 
(Friedman 1970). This led to the formulation of the trade-off hypothesis, which says 
that taking the environment into account in company decision-making will adversely 
affect profitability. 
• End-of-pipe technologies
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Background Paper – “The Reinforcement Effect: How Climate 
Concerns Foster Competitiveness in the Global Economy”
o U-shaped relationship between CFP and CEP (TLGT)
o Hypotheses supporting a positive relationship:
1. Porter hypothesis: innovation + first-mover advantages
2. Natural Resource Based View: organizational capabilities + 
anticipation of future regulation
3. Instrumental stakeholder theory: reputational advantages, including 
higher stock market values + increased business performance
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Background Paper – “The Reinforcement Effect: How Climate 
Concerns Foster Competitiveness in the Global Economy”
o U-shaped relationship between CFP and CEP (TLGT)
o Possible reconciliation of these conflicting hypotheses: U-shaped 
relationship
o “there is a negative CEP–CFP relationship for 
companies with low CEP and a positive 
association for high CEP” 
(Trumpp and Guenther 2015)
o = Too little of a good thing (TLGT) effect
o Tested on 700 EU and US companies
o Companies employing a reactive strategy will tend
to have more costs than benefits, while companies 
that pursue a proactive environmental strategy may
have higher benefits than costs. 
Figure 4. A U-shaped relationship between
corporate environmental performance
(CEP) and corporate financial performance
(CFP). Source: adapted from Trumpp and
Guenther (2015).
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Background Paper – “The Reinforcement Effect: How Climate 
Concerns Foster Competitiveness in the Global Economy”
o U-shaped relationship between CFP and CEP (TLGT)
o fits with the “three pillars” view of sustainable development, namely 
that economic prosperity depends on social and environmental 
protection and vice-versa. Perhaps the sustainable development 
paradigm is just as true for a single company as it is for the 
entire planet
o But also, and crucially, depends on the environment in which these 
companies operate
o More research is required to verify these claims!
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Background Paper – “The Reinforcement Effect: How Climate 
Concerns Foster Competitiveness in the Global Economy”
o Link betweeen reinforcement effect and U-shaped relationship 
between CFP and CEP (TLGT)
o Not necessarily the case!
o TLGT effect can, in principle, be explained by a “rational” strategy, aimed at 
increasing business performance through all associated benefits
o However, best empirical examples show that some level of normative 
engagement seems to highly stimulate the employment of a proactive 
environmental strategy
o Perhaps linked to the credibility of such a strategy (both internal and external 
to the firm).
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Operationalization: How to measure/observe norms and material 
incentives for climate action
o How to measure/observe genuine normative concerns for climate 
change:
1. ASK: how do firms communicate about climate change
2. CHECK: what are the lobbying positions of firms (e.g. EC 
consultations on climate policies)
3. LOOK: verify this with actual behaviour of the firm in terms of 
emission reductions
4. THIRD OPINION: what do other, independent analysts think of the 
firm’s actual attitude?
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Operationalization: How to measure/observe norms and material 
incentives for climate action
o How to measure/observe material incentives for climate change
o Conditional on wide number of variables:
1. Carbon pricing
2. Standard setting (e.g. EE for appliances, buildings, cars)
3. Energy costs
4. Customer preferences
5. Supply chain influence
6. Competitiveness of the sector
7. Availability of cost-effective alternative products/production methods, 
e.g.:
• Steel or cement production
• Electric vehicles
Operationalizing Norms, Material Incentives and Climate Action
The effect of the Paris Agreement on Norms and Incentives for Climate 
Action
o Paris Agreement
o Major global relevance of the 2015 Paris Agreement
o Joint US-China ratification at G-20 summit in Hangzhou
o Major normative / material / policy
“signal” to investors
o But implementation remains key!
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Are we at a Tipping Point for climate action?
Thank you!
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